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Nowadays	   robots	   exhibit	   a	   wide	   variety	   of	   cognitive	   abilities,	   among	   them	   that	   of	  
learning	   from	   bad	   experiences.	   Does	   this	  mean	   that	   robots	  may	   have	   doubts	   about	  
what	  course	  of	  action	  to	  take	  and	  ultimately	  be	  able	  to	  experience	  pain?	  
Before	  trying	  to	  answer	  this	  question,	  let	  me	  quote	  the	  Nobel	  prize	  Herbert	  A.	  Simon,	  
who	   in	   the	   late	  sixties	  claimed	  that	  we	  should	  not	  push	  biological	   inspiration	  too	   far	  
when	  designing	  artificial	  creatures,	  since	  the	  best	  natural	  mechanisms	  may	  not	  be	  the	  
best	   artificial	   ones	   [20].	  Wheels,	   airplanes’	   non-­‐flapping	  wings,	   and	   calculators	   have	  
often	  been	  mentioned	  as	   examples	  of	   artificial	   solutions	   considerably	  different	   from	  
their	   natural	   equivalents,	   and	   more	   performant	   according	   to	   certain	   criteria.	   The	  
resources	  available	   to	  engineering	  design	  depart	  a	   lot	   from	  those	   in	  nature,	  and	  not	  
just	  when	   it	   comes	   to	  materials,	   but	   also	   in	   the	  number	  of	   instances	  and	   spendable	  
time.	   Robots	   have	   been	   incrementally	   designed	   along	   sixty	   years	   of	   technological	  
research,	  instead	  of	  being	  the	  outcome	  of	  thousands	  of	  years	  of	  evolution.	  
Thus,	  in	  case	  of	  existence,	  robot	  pain	  and	  robot	  cognition	  must	  be	  of	  a	  different	  nature	  
than	  human	  ones,	  and	  if	  these	  labels	  are	  used,	   it	   is	  because	  the	  underlying	  functions	  
play	  a	  similar	  role	  as	  those	  of	  their	  human	  counterparts.	  
With	   this	   note	   of	   caution	   in	  mind	   and	   accepting	   that	   biological	   plausibility	   adds	   no	  
special	   value	   from	   an	   engineering	   viewpoint,	   there	   is	   no	   doubt	   that	   human	   biology	  
constitutes	   a	   great	   source	   of	   inspiration	   for	   robotics	   researchers,	   since	   it	   provides	  
existence	  proofs	  of	  many	  useful	  physical	  and	  cognitive	  mechanisms.	  Thus,	  robots	  often	  
have	  an	  anthropomorphic	  anatomy	  with	  legs,	  arms	  and	  hands	  having	  as	  many	  degrees	  
of	  freedom	  as	  the	  human	  ones,	  their	  actuators	  mimicking	  the	  flexibility	  and	  power	  of	  
biological	  muscles,	  with	  visual,	  auditive,	  tactile	  as	  well	  as	  proprioceptive	  sensors,	  and	  
with	   a	   hierarchical	   control	   system	  whose	   uppest	   layer	   is	   a	   symbolic	   decision	  maker	  
that	  governs	  lower	  layers	  often	  in	  the	  form	  of	  neural	  networks	  encoding	  sensorimotor	  
mappings.	  
In	  trying	  to	  unravel	  the	  roles	  pain	  may	  play	  at	  all	  these	  levels,	  we	  adopt	  the	  distinctions	  
between	  types	  of	  pain	  made	  by	  de	  Vignemont	  [4].	  A	  first	  distinction	  is	  between	  chronic	  
pains,	   occurrent	   pains,	   and	   pain	   expertise	   based	   on	   prior	   experiences	   of	   pain.	   Since	  
chronic	   pains	   do	   not	   have	   adaptive	   value	   and	   thus	   cannot	   fulfill	   a	   function	   in	   robot	  
development,	   we	   will	   not	   consider	   them	   further.	   Occurrent	   pains	   can	   be	   used	   as	  
punishment	   within	   reinforcement	   learning	   schemes,	   as	   described	   in	   Section	   2,	  
whereas	   pain	   expertise	   can	   be	   incorporated	   in	   a	   motivational/cognitive	   system	  
modulating	  reactions	  to	  stimuli,	  as	  elaborated	  in	  Section	  3.	  One	  can	  further	  distinguish	  
between	   merely	   unpleasant	   and	   excruciating	   pains,	   upon	   which	   the	   motivational	  
modulation	  will	  act	  differently.	  	  
Another	  useful	  distinction	  is	  between	  exogenous	  and	  endogenous	  pains.	  Although	  it	  is	  
clear	   that	   the	  underlying	  criterion	   is	  whether	   the	  cause	   is	  external	  or	   internal	   to	   the	  
organism,	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  concrete	  examples	  of	  each	  we	  need	  to	  enter	  the	  slippery	  
terrain	  of	  defining	  what	  we	  mean	  by	  robot	  pain.	  A	  short	  digression	  may	  help.	  This	  is	  an	  
excerpt	  of	  a	  fictional	  dialog	  [5]	  in	  which	  “Russell”	  argues	  for	  the	  importance	  of	  a	  clear	  
definition	  of	  pain	  to	  make	  scientific	  progress,	  while	  “Edison”	  takes	  the	  pragmatic	  view	  
of	  the	  inventor	  who	  just	  wants	  to	  build	  robots	  whose	  pain	  serves	  a	  function:	  
RUSSELL:	   How	   do	   we	   define	   self	   and	   pain	   in	   ways	   that	   even	   begin	   to	   be	   meaningful	   for	   a	  
machine?	  For	  example,	  a	  machine	  may	  overheat	  and	  have	  a	  sensor	  that	  measures	  temperature	  
as	  part	  of	  a	  feedback	  loop	  to	  reduce	  overheating,	  but	  a	  high	  temperature	  reading	  has	  nothing	  
to	  do	  with	  pain.	  
We	  agree:	  this	  would	  correspond	  to	  nociception,	  not	  pain,	  at	  least	  in	  humans.	  
EDISON:	  I	  disagree!	  Overheating	  is	  not	  human	  pain	  for	  sure	  but	  certainly	  “machine”	  pain!	  I	  see	  
no	  problem	   in	  defining	   self	  and	  pain	   for	  a	   robot.	  The	   self	   could	  be	   (at	   least	   in	  part)	  machine	  
integrity	  with	  all	  functions	  operational	  within	  nominal	  parameters.	  And	  pain	  occurs	  with	  input	  
from	  sensors	  that	  are	  tuned	  to	  detect	  non-­‐nominal	  parameter	  changes	  (excessive	  force	  exerted	  
by	  the	  weight	  at	  the	  end	  of	  a	  robot	  arm).	  
Paradoxically,	  we	   agree	  with	   this	   view	   too.	   A	   percept	   that	   compromises	   the	   normal	  
functioning	  of	  the	  robot	  could	  be	  interpreted	  as	  robot	  pain.	  	  
RUSSELL:	  [..]	  my	  earlier	  examples	  were	  to	  make	  clear	  that	  “pain”	  and	  detection	  of	  parameter	  
changes	  are	  quite	  different.	  If	  I	  have	  a	  perfect	  local	  anesthetic	  but	  smell	  my	  skin	  burning,	  then	  I	  
feel	  no	  pain	  but	  have	  sensed	  a	  crucial	  parameter	  change.	  True,	  we	  cannot	  expect	  all	  aspects	  of	  
human	  pain	  to	  be	  useful	  for	  the	  analysis	  of	  robots,	  but	  it	  does	  no	  good	  to	  throw	  away	  crucial	  
distinctions	  we	  have	  learned	  from	  the	  studies	  of	  humans	  or	  other	  animals.	  
Of	  course,	  we	  intend	  to	  keep	  crucial	  distinctions,	  and	  we	  note	  that	  the	  word	  “crucial”	  
has	   a	   self-­‐referential	  meaning	   in	   the	   paragraph	   above,	   as	   it	   provides	   the	   key	   to	   our	  
pragmatic	  definition	  of	   robot	  pain:	  a	  crucial	  parameter	  change	  that	  diminishes	   robot	  
competence	  and	  degrades	  its	  performance.	  
EDISON:	   [..]	   Inspired	   by	  what	  was	   learned	  with	   fear	   in	   rats,	   a	   roboticist	  would	   say	   “OK!	  My	  
walking	  robot	  has	  analogous	  problems:	  encountering	  a	  predator—for	  a	  mobile	  robot,	  a	  car	  or	  
truck	   in	   the	   street—and	   reacting	   to	   a	   low	   battery	   state,	  which	   signals	   the	   robot	   to	   prepare	  
itself	   for	   functioning	   in	  a	  different	  mode,	  where	  energy	  needs	   to	  be	  saved.”	  Those	   two	  robot	  
behaviors	   are	   very	   similar	   to	   the	   rat	   behaviors	   in	   the	   operational	   sense	   that	   they	   serve	   the	  
same	  kind	  of	  purpose.	  I	  think	  we	  might	  just	  as	  well	  call	  them	  “fear”	  and	  “pain.”	  I	  would	  argue	  
that	   it	   does	   not	  matter	  what	   I	   call	   them—the	   roboticist	   can	   still	   be	   inspired	   by	   their	   neural	  
implementations	  and	  design	  the	  robotic	  system	  accordingly.	  
We	  will	   follow	   this	   biologically-­‐inspired,	   operational	   approach	  here	   and,	   adhering	   to	  
our	  above-­‐mentioned	  pragmatic	  definition	  of	  robot	  pain,	  colliding	  with	  an	  obstacle	  or	  
getting	  too	  close	  to	  a	  light	  source	  so	  that	  the	  camera	  saturates	  would	  be	  examples	  of	  
exogenous	   pain,	   while	   an	   endogenous	   pain	   would	   involve	   proprioceptive	   sensors	  
detecting,	  for	  instance,	  that	  a	  robot	  arm	  is	  at	  a	  singular	  configuration,	  thus	  lacking	  one	  
degree	   of	   freedom,	   or	   simply	   that	   a	   joint	   has	   reached	   its	   limit,	   thus	   losing	  
manipulability.	  All	  these	  situations	  have	  in	  common	  that	  robot	  competence	  decreases	  
and	  performance	  degrades.	  
It	   is	  worth	  mentioning	   that	   endogenous	  pains	   can	   contribute	   to	   the	   acquisition	  of	   a	  
body	   schema	   by	   the	   robot	   (a	   kinematic	   model	   of	   its	   mobility),	   which	   is	   loosely	  
reminiscent	   of	   the	   development	   of	   a	   sense	   of	   bodily	   ownership	   in	   humans,	   as	  
described	   in	   Section	   2.2.	   Although	   some	   authors	   relate	   the	   discovery	   of	   the	   body	  
boundaries	   to	   the	   distinction	   between	   self	   and	   others,	   and	   ultimately	   to	   the	  
emergence	  of	  a	  conscious	  self,	  we	  share	  the	  view	  of	  Hoffmann	  et	  al.	  (2010)	  that	  robots	  
have	   not	   yet	   reached	   the	   level	   of	   competence	   where	   notions	   like	   conscious	  
representations	  can	  be	  investigated	  in	  a	  grounded	  fashion.	  
Going	  back	  to	  the	   initial	  question,	   in	  this	  chapter	  we	  will	   try	  to	  unravel	  the	  role	  pain	  
(and	   choice)	   may	   play	   in	   developing	   robot	   competences.	   We	   can	   pinpoint	   at	   least	  
three	   adaptive	   functions	   where	   pain	   plays	   a	   role	   in	   the	   biological	   world	   and	   which	  
have	   been	   incorporated	   into	   robots,	   namely	   learning	   through	   reward/punishment	  
(both	   at	   the	   sensorimotor	   and	   cognitive	   levels),	   providing	   intrinsic	   motivation,	   and	  
engaging	   in	   empathic	   interaction.	  While	   in	   punishment	   and	   aversive	  motivation	   the	  
robot	   can	   be	   said	   to	   “experience”	   pain,	   although	   in	   its	   own	   artificial	   way,	   the	  
interaction	  context	  entails	  perceiving	  pain	  in	  humans	  and	  (up	  to	  now)	  faking	  empathy	  
so	  as	  to	  give	  them	  comfort,	  thus	  being	  of	  a	  very	  different	  nature.	  In	  what	  follows	  we	  
will	  concentrate	  on	  the	  former	  contexts	  in	  which	  robots	  “experience”	  pain,	  which	  can	  
all	  be	  formulated	  in	  the	  common	  framework	  of	  reinforcement	  learning.	  
2.	  Occurrent	  pain	  as	  punishment	  in	  reinforcement	  learning	  
In	  the	  biological	  world,	  occurrent	  pain	  clearly	  serves	  an	  adaptive	  purpose	  by	  eliciting	  
escape	  responses	  and	  thus	  protecting	  organisms	  from	  further	  danger.	  Taking	  a	  design	  
perspective,	  adaptivity	  could	  be	  dispensable	  for	  robots	  that	  perform	  repetitive	  tasks	  in	  
predefined	  environments	  (such	  as	  production	  lines),	  but	  it	  is	  a	  sine	  qua	  non	  if	  they	  are	  
to	   work	   and	   survive	   in	   human,	   dynamic	   scenarios,	   where	   there	   is	   no	   expert	  
programmer	  at	  hand.	  Among	  the	  repertoire	  of	  artificial	  adaptive	  mechanisms	  ranging	  
from	  unsupervised	  to	  supervised	  ones	  [24],	  reinforcement	  learning	  (RL)	  algorithms	  are	  
the	   most	   appropriate	   in	   the	   aforementioned	   scenarios,	   where	   evaluating	   the	  
performance	  of	  a	  behavior	  is	  possible	  but	  the	  optimal	  behavior	  is	  unknown.	  	  
Reinforcement	  Learning	  (RL)	  refers	  to	  the	  process	  of	   improving	  performance	  through	  
trial	  and	  error.	  The	  simplest	  RL	  algorithms	  rely	  on	  the	  intuitive	  idea	  that	  if	  an	  action	  is	  
followed	  by	  an	  improvement	  in	  the	  robot’s	  state,	  then	  the	  tendency	  to	  produce	  such	  
action	   should	  be	   strengthened	   in	   that	   situation,	  whereas	   it	   should	  be	  weakened	   if	   a	  
negative	  effect	   like	  pain	  occurs.	  This	   is	  the	  classic	  mechanism	  of	  reward/punishment.	  
More	  formally,	  RL	  algorithms	  entail	  progressively	  building	  a	  mapping	  from	  situations	  to	  
actions	  so	  as	  to	  maximize	  a	  scalar	  reward	  or	  reinforcement	  signal.	  The	  robot	  is	  not	  told	  
which	   action	   to	   take,	   as	   in	   supervised	   learning,	   but	   instead	   must	   discover	   which	  
actions	  yield	  the	  highest	  reward	  by	  trying	  them.	   In	  more	  complex	  cases,	  actions	  may	  
affect	  not	  only	  the	  immediate	  reward,	  but	  also	  the	  next	  situation,	  and	  through	  that	  all	  
subsequent	   rewards.	   These	   two	   characteristics—trial-­‐and-­‐error	   search	   and	   delayed	  
reward—are	  the	  two	  most	  important	  distinguishing	  features	  of	  reinforcement	  learning	  
[22].	  
Figure	   1(a)	   shows	   the	   classic	   diagram	   of	   an	   RL	   agent	   (e.g.,	   a	   robot	   controller)	  
interacting	  with	  its	  environment.	  The	  agent	  generates	  actions	  in	  the	  context	  of	  sensed	  
states	   of	   this	   environment,	   and	   its	   actions	   influence	   how	   the	   environment’s	   states	  
change	  over	  time.	  The	  environment	  contains	  a	  “critic”	  component	  that,	  at	  each	  time	  
step,	  provides	  the	  agent	  with	  a	  numeric	  evaluation	  of	  its	  ongoing	  behavior.	  The	  term	  
critic	  is	  used,	  instead	  of	  “teacher”,	  because	  in	  supervised	  learning	  algorithms	  a	  teacher	  
provides	  more	  informative	  instructional	  information,	  such	  as	  directly	  telling	  the	  agent	  
what	  its	  actions	  should	  have	  been	  instead	  of	  merely	  scoring	  them.	  
In	   the	   biological	   world,	   the	   critic’s	   evaluation	   corresponds	   to	   what	   behavioral	  
psychologists	   call	  primary	   reward,	   namely	   that	  encouraging	  behavior	  directly	   related	  
to	   survival	   and	   reproductive	   success,	   such	   as	   eating,	   drinking,	   and	   escaping.	   The	  
mapping	   from	   states	   to	   rewards	   is	   called	   a	   reward	   function,	   which	   is	   an	   essential	  
component	   of	   RL	   algorithms	   since	   it	   implicitly	   encodes	   the	   problem	   the	   agent	  must	  
learn	  to	  solve.	  Pain	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  negative	  reward.	  
(a)	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Figure	   1.	   Agent-­‐environment	   interaction	   in	   reinforcement	   learning	   [2].	   (a)	   Primary	  
reward	   signals	   are	   supplied	   to	   the	   agent	   from	   a	   “critic”	   in	   its	   environment.	   (b)	   A	  
refinement	   in	   which	   the	   environment	   is	   divided	   into	   an	   internal	   and	   an	   external	  
environment,	   with	   all	   reward	   signals	   coming	   from	   the	   former.	   The	   shaded	   box	  
corresponds	  to	  what	  we	  would	  think	  of	  as	  the	  animal	  or	  robot.	  	  
	  
As	  mentioned	  above,	  the	  objective	  of	  a	  complex	  agent	  is	  to	  act	  at	  each	  time	  step	  so	  as	  
to	  maximize	  not	  the	  immediate	  reward,	  but	  the	  total	  reward	  it	  expects	  to	  receive	  over	  
the	  future	  (called	  the	  expected	  return),	  which	  is	  usually	  a	  weighted	  sum	  in	  which	  later	  
rewards	  are	  weighted	  less	  than	  earlier	  ones.	  Because	  the	  agent’s	  actions	  influence	  the	  
environment’s	   state	   over	   time,	   maximizing	   expected	   return	   requires	   the	   agent	   to	  
control	  the	  evolution	  of	  its	  environment.	  This	  is	  very	  challenging,	  since	  the	  agent	  might	  
have	   to	   sacrifice	   short-­‐term	   reward	   in	   order	   to	   achieve	  more	   reward	   over	   the	   long	  
term.	  Some	  pains	  are	  bearable	  if	  the	  expected	  return	  is	  high	  enough.	  
The	  simplest	  RL	  agents	  attempt	  to	  achieve	  this	  objective	  by	  adjusting	  a	  policy,	  which	  is	  
a	  rule	  that	  associates	  actions	  to	  observed	  environment	  states.	  A	  policy	  corresponds	  to	  
a	   stimulus-­‐response	   (S-­‐R)	   rule	   of	   animal	   learning	   theory.	   But	   RL	   is	   not	   restricted	   to	  
simple	  S-­‐R	  agents:	  more	  complex	  RL	  agents	   learn	  models	  of	   their	  environments	   that	  
they	  can	  use	  to	  make	  plans	  about	  how	  to	  act	  appropriately.	  This	  entails	  the	  capacity	  to	  
predict	  and	  choose	  between	  alternative	  courses	  of	  action.	  
Analogously,	   RL	   in	   Robotics	   is	   applied	   in	   two	   rather	   different	   forms	   depending	   on	  
whether	   it	   takes	   place	   at	   the	   sensorimotor	   or	   cognitive	   levels.	   Sensorimotor	  
adaptation	   is	   implemented	  by	  building	  mappings	   from	  stimuli	   to	  proper	  movements,	  
while	   cognitive	   learning	   entails	   constructing	   symbolic	   representations	   to	   guide	  
decision-­‐making.	  In	  the	  following	  two	  subsections	  we	  will	  describe	  how	  associative	  S-­‐R	  
agents	   have	   been	   used	   to	   learn	   robot	   sensorimotor	   mappings	   and	   a	   body	   schema,	  
respectively,	   whereas	   symbolic	   RL	   agents	   for	   learning	   to	   plan	   will	   be	   described	   in	  
Section	  3.2.	  A	  detailed	  survey	  of	  the	  challenges	  and	  successes	  in	  the	  application	  of	  RL	  
to	  Robotics	  is	  provided	  in	  [9].	  
2.1.	  Reinforcement	  learning	  of	  sensorimotor	  mappings	  
Motion	   control,	   both	   in	   biological	   and	   technological	   systems,	   relies	   strongly	   on	  
sensorimotor	  mappings.	  These	  mappings	  vary	  depending	  not	  only	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  
involved	  sensors	  and	  actuators,	  but	  also	  on	  the	  goal	  pursued.	  Hand-­‐eye	  coordination	  
and	   stable	   walking	   are	   skills	   that	   may	   be	   acquired	   through	   reinforcement	   learning,	  
their	   underlying	   sensorimotor	   mappings	   involving	   visual	   and	   proprioceptive	   signals,	  
respectively,	  and	   their	   reward	   functions	   relying	  on	  somewhat	  delayed	  reinforcement	  
in	  the	  form	  of	  success	  (object	  grasped)	  or	  pain	  (falling	  down).	  	  
Despite	  their	  apparent	  disparity,	  these	  mappings	  have	  in	  common	  an	  underlying	  highly	  
nonlinear	  relation	  between	  a	  continuous	  (often	  hard	  to	  interpret)	  input	  domain	  and	  a	  
continuous	  motor	  domain;	  a	  relation	  that	  in	  most	  cases	  would	  be	  impossible	  to	  derive	  
analytically.	   Thus,	   such	   relation	   needs	   to	   be	   approximated	   through	   associative	  
learning.	  Neural	  network	  architectures	  have	  the	  versatility	  to	  encode	  a	  large	  range	  of	  
nonlinear	   mappings	   and,	   through	   RL,	   they	   have	   proven	   adequate	   to	   handle	   the	  
massively-­‐parallel	  task	  of	  relating	  perception	  patterns	  to	  motor	  commands.	  
For	   further	   details,	   the	   reader	   is	   referred	   to	   a	   review	   of	   neural	   learning	   algorithms	  
used	  to	  approximate	  sensorimotor	  mappings	  for	  the	  control	  of	  articulated	  robots	  [25].	  
Similar	   procedures	   apply	   to	   wheeled	   robot	   navigation	   [14],	   where	   a	   mapping	   from	  
proximity	  sensor	  readings	  to	  obstacle	  avoidance	  motions	  is	   learnt	  by	  using	  as	  reward	  
function	   the	   pain	   (or	   punishment)	   derived	   from	   collisions	   with	   environmental	  
obstacles.	  
2.2.	  Acquisition	  of	  a	  body	  schema	  
In	  this	  volume,	  de	  Vignemont	  [4]	  relates	  pain	  to	  the	   learning	  of	  the	  body	  boundaries	  
and	  ultimately	   to	   the	  development	  of	  a	  bodily	   self.	  Along	   the	   same	   line	  but	  without	  
referring	   to	   pain,	  Haselager	   et	   al.	   [6]	   highlight	   the	   importance	  of	   sensing	   one’s	   own	  
movements	  for	  the	  development	  of	  a	  nonconceptual	  sense	  of	  self.	  These	  authors	  claim	  
that	  proprioception	  and	  kinesthesis	  are	  essential	  in	  this	  development,	  and	  make	  a	  plea	  
for	   robots	   to	  be	  equipped	  with	  a	   richer	  sense	  of	  proprioception,	  so	  as	   to	  advance	   in	  
the	  understanding	  of	  creatures	  acting	  in	  the	  world	  with	  a	  sense	  of	  themselves.	  	  
In	   neurosciences,	   the	   correlation	   of	   proprioceptive	   sensory	   information,	   e.g.	   joint	  
configurations,	  with	  the	  visible	  shape	  of	  the	  body	  has	  been	  termed	  “body	  schema”	  and	  
is	   assumed	   to	   provide	   an	   unconscious	   awareness	   of	   the	   current	   body	   state.	  
Experiments	   with	   both	   macaque	   monkeys	   and	   humans	   have	   shown	   that	   the	   body	  
schema	   is	  not	   congenital	   but	   learnable	   [11],	   and	  may	  not	  be	  a	   localized	  pattern	  but	  
rather	   be	   distributed	   across	   several	   groups	   of	   connected	   neurons	   that	   represent	  
opportunistically-­‐learned	  manifolds	  spanning	  several	  brain	  regions	  [21].	  	  
Hoffmann	  et	  al.	  [7]	  provide	  a	  detailed	  review	  of	  robotics	  works	  tackling	  the	  learning	  of	  
a	   body	   schema,	  which	   they	   define	   to	   be	   a	   sensorimotor	   representation	  of	   the	  body	  
used	  for	  action.	  As	  an	  example,	  for	  arm	  robots	  such	  representation	  is	  usually	  restricted	  
to	  an	   inverse	  kinematics/dynamics	  mapping	   relating	   the	  gripper’s	  pose	   (position	  and	  
orientation)	  and	  velocity	  to	  the	  arm’s	  joint	  angles	  and	  torques.	  Then,	  according	  to	  this	  
definition,	   the	   body	   schema	   can	   be	   learned	   in	   the	   same	   way	   as	   the	   sensorimotor	  
mappings	   in	   the	   previous	   subsection	   by	   using	   pose/velocity	   as	   input	   and	   the	   robot	  
kinematic	  parameters	  as	  output.	  
Besides	   this	   parameter	   adjustment	   of	   phylogenetic	   skills	   through	   learning,	   biological	  
creatures	  show	  an	  impressive	  capacity	  to	  adapt	  their	  body	  scheme	  to	  newly	  acquired	  
abilities	  (e.g.,	  tool	  usage)	  as	  well	  as	  to	  abrupt	  changes	  in	  their	  bodies	  (e.g.,	  limb	  loss).	  	  
For	  instance,	  a	  monkey’s	  proximal	  visual	  receptive	  field	  was	  enlarged	  by	  the	  length	  of	  a	  
tool	   after	   being	   trained	   to	   use	   it	   [11].	   This	   led	   to	   hypothesize	   that	   the	   tool	   itself	  
became	   incorporated	   into	   the	   monkey's	   own	   body	   schema	   [3].	   Similar	   conclusions	  
were	  drawn	  from	  experiments	  with	  human	  patients	  who	  suffered	  from	  phantom	  pain	  
after	  having	  lost	  a	  limb.	  	  
Not	   surprisingly,	   replicating	   this	   capacity	   has	   arisen	   a	   lot	   of	   interest	   in	   the	   robotics	  
community,	   since	  making	   robots	   adaptive	   to	   changes	   in	   their	   own	   geometry	   due	   to	  
damage,	   wear-­‐and-­‐tear	   or	   tool	   replacement	   increases	   their	   robustness	   and	   widens	  
their	  range	  of	  application.	  Hence,	  neural	  learning	  algorithms	  have	  been	  used	  to	  learn	  
not	   the	   whole	   kinematics	   mapping	   from	   scratch,	   as	   previously	   done,	   but	   only	   the	  
deviations	  from	  the	  nominal	  kinematics	  embedded	  in	  the	  original	  robot	  controller	  [18],	  
resulting	  in	  a	  significant	  speed-­‐up	  that	  permits	  online	  adaptation	  of	  the	  body	  schema,	  
a	  crucial	  feature	  for	  autonomous	  robots	  that	  need	  to	  operate	  for	  a	  long	  time	  without	  
assistance	   (e.g.,	   in	   space).	   Likewise,	   the	   body	   schema	  of	   humanoid	   robots	   has	   been	  
extended	  to	  encompass	  a	  tool	  through	  training	  [26]	  and	  RL	  algorithms	  relying	  on	  a	  self-­‐
model	   have	   been	   implemented	   on	   an	   hexapod	   robot	   that	   needed	   to	   adapt	   to	   leg	  
removal,	  broken	  legs	  and	  motor	  failures	  [10].	  
As	  a	   final	  note,	   let	  us	  mention	   that	  hand	   in	  hand	  with	   the	  development	  of	   the	  body	  
representation,	   infants	  acquire	  a	  notion	  of	  body	  ownership	  and	  agency,	  which	  at	  the	  
present	  time	  goes	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  functional	  approach	  to	  robot	  pain	  adopted	  
in	  this	  chapter.	  
3.	  Pain	  expertise	  as	  a	  form	  of	  emotion	  and	  knowledge	  
Animal	   behavior	   is	   the	   joint	   effect	   of	   environmental	   sensory	   impingement	   and	   the	  
animal’s	  emotions	  and	  knowledge	  of	   the	  situation.	   In	  Rolls’	  evolutionary	  theory	   [17],	  
the	  flexibility	  of	  behavioral	  responses	  to	  reinforcing	  stimuli	  is	  the	  crucial	  function	  that	  
explains	   why	   emotion	   and	   knowledge	   are	   so	   important.	   The	   essential	   idea	   is	   that	  
reward	   and	   punishment	   specify	   behavioral	   goals,	   instead	   of	   particular	   actions,	   thus	  
defining	  flexible	  routes	  to	  action.	  This	  is	  in	  contrast	  to	  stimulus-­‐response	  (S-­‐R)	  learning	  
in	  which	  a	  particular	  response	  to	  a	  particular	  stimulus	   is	   learned,	  as	  described	   in	  the	  
preceding	  section.	  	  
Notably,	   this	   modulation	   of	   behavior	   can	   be	   formulated	   in	   the	   same	   framework	   of	  
reinforcement	   learning,	   and	   in	   the	   next	   two	   subsections	   we	   will	   show	   that	   pain	  
expertise	   (i.e.,	   that	  based	  on	  prior	  experiences	  of	  pain)	   can	  be	  a	   source	  of	  emotions	  
and	  knowledge	  effectively	  exerting	  such	  modulation.	  
3.1.	  Emotion	  provides	  intrinsic	  motivation	  in	  reinforcement	  learning	  
The	   reinforcement	   learning	   (RL)	   framework	   is	   particularly	   appropriate	   for	   bringing	  
learning	  together	  with	  what	  in	  animals	  one	  would	  call	  intrinsic	  motivation	  [2].	  Despite	  
the	   common	   perception	   that	   an	   RL	   agent’s	   reward	   has	   to	   be	   extrinsic	   because	   the	  
agent	  has	  a	  distinct	  input	  channel	  for	  reward	  signals,	  reward	  functions	  can	  depend	  on	  
the	  state	  of	  the	  robot’s	  internal	  environment,	  which	  includes	  remembered	  and	  learned	  
information	  (see	  Figure	  1(b)).	  
The	  dominant	  animal’s	  motivation	  at	  any	  given	  time	  influences	  the	  arousal,	  strength,	  
and	   direction	   of	   behavior.	   Similarly,	   each	   robot	  motivation	  may	   have	   a	   quantitative	  
intensity	  and	  the	  motivation	  with	  the	  current	  highest	  intensity	  will	  modulate	  the	  robot	  
reaction	  to	  stimuli.	  Where	  could	  robot	  motivation	  come	  from?	  Emotions	  are	  certainly	  
motivating;	   for	   example,	   fear	   learned	   by	   stimulus-­‐pain	   association	   provides	   the	  
motivation	  to	  avoid	  noxious	  stimuli.	  	  
Rumbell	  et	  al.	  [19]	  review	  emotion	  mechanisms	  that	  have	  been	  used	  in	  artificial	  agents	  
to	   improve	  action	  selection.	  Many	  include	  arousal	  and	  pleasure/pain	  components,	  to	  
which	  the	  synthetic	  forces	  approach	  adds	  a	  clarity/confusion	  one.	  Emotion	  modulates	  
behavior	   by	   using	   arousal	   to	   focus	   attention	   and	   associating	   pleasure/pain	   to	   goals,	  
i.e.,	  courses	  of	  action	  that	  should	  be	  pursued	  or	  avoided.	  Confusion	  tends	  to	  increase	  
pain,	  and	  clarity	  tends	  to	  increase	  pleasure,	  ensuring	  that	  the	  agent	  will	  seek	  situations	  
where	  its	  expectations	  are	  confirmed.	  	  
But	   is	   robot	   emotion	   (e.g.,	   fear	   of	   pain)	   possible?	   Currently,	   there	   are	   two	   main	  
programs	  of	   scientific	   research	   investigating	   this	  question:	  psychological	  behaviorism	  
and	  role	  functionalism.	  Psychological	  behaviorism	  assumes	  that	  emotion	  behavior	  can	  
be	   explained	   in	   a	   robot	   without	   reference	   to	   subjective	   or	   mental	   states.	   On	   the	  
contrary,	   a	   role	   functionalist	   defines	   pain	   as	   “a	   subjective	   qualitative	   state	   that	   is	  
reliably	  caused	  by	  noxious	   stimulation,	   to	  cause	   the	  desire	   to	  make	   it	   stop,	   to	  cause	  
distraction	  regarding	  concurrent	  projects	  or	  plans	  and	  their	  completion,	  and	  to	  cause	  
changes	   in	   preferences	   among	   alternative	   states	   of	   affairs”	   [27].	   According	   to	   role-­‐
functionalism,	   only	   beings	   with	   subjective	   qualitative	   states	   that	   fulfill	   these	   causal	  
roles	  can	  be	  in	  pain.	  	  
Following	   this	   view,	   Parisi	   and	   Petrosino	   [16]	   equipped	   robots	   with	   an	   emotional	  
circuit	  and	  devised	  five	  experiments,	  one	  of	  them	  exploring	  robot	  pain.	  Their	  claim	  was	  
that,	  for	  robots	  to	  “experience”	  pain,	  they	  need	  to	  have	  more	  than	  one	  dispositional	  
motivation;	   and	   competition	   between	   the	   motivations	   must	   result	   in	   an	   overriding	  
aversion,	   or	   some	   disposition	   to	   avoid	   if	   the	   result	   is	   to	   be	   painfulness.	   In	   the	  
experiment,	   the	   emotional	   circuit	   succeeded	   in	   arousing	   a	   compelling	   aversion,	  
despite	   concurrent	   hunger.	   Thus,	   in	   the	   terms	   of	   role-­‐functionalism,	   Parisi	   and	  
Petrosino’s	  robots	  are	  considered	  to	  be	   in	  pain	  because	   it	   is	  possible	  to	  describe	  the	  
functional	  role	  that	  pain	  states	  have	  in	  their	  behavior	  and	  to	  identify	  the	  specific	  part	  
of	  the	  neural	  network	  causing	  their	  behavior	  that	  makes	  pain	  states	  possible.	  	  
3.2.	  Reinforcement	  learning	  to	  plan	  	  
To	  go	  beyond	  sensorimotor	  adaptation	  and	  emotionally-­‐modulated	  reactive	  behavior,	  
planning	   capabilities	   are	   needed	   and,	   in	   order	   to	   develop	   them,	   a	   cognitive	  
architecture	   [28]	   should	   be	   able	   to	   progressively	   learn	   an	   action	   model	   from	  
experiences	   and	   rehearse	   hypothetical	   future	   scenarios	   on	   that	   model	   so	   as	   to	  
determine	   the	   best	   course	   of	   action.	   Moreover,	   such	   action	   model	   must	   be	  
probabilistic	  to	  account	  for	  noise	  in	  perceptions	  and	  uncertainties	  in	  action	  outcomes.	  	  
Relational	   reinforcement	   learning	   [23]	   has	   been	   developed	   towards	   this	   aim.	   By	  
enhancing	   RL	   with	   relational	   representations	   of	   states	   and	   actions	   (i.e.,	   explicitly	  
encoding	   relations	   in	   a	   symbolic	   data	   structure),	   the	   knowledge	   acquired	   by	   the	   RL	  
agent	  can	  be	  generalized	  across	  states	  and	  transferred	  across	  tasks	  [13].	  	  
Some	   robot	   actions	   may	   be	   irreversible	   leading	   to	   unrecoverable	   failures	   (e.g.,	  
damaging	  some	  robot	  element,	  breaking	  an	  object	  or	  losing	  a	  tool).	  On	  the	  contrary,	  a	  
planner	   can	   always	   backtrack	   from	   a	   dead-­‐end	   so	   as	   to	   try	   to	   find	   an	   alternative	  
sequence	   of	   actions	   to	   reach	   the	   goal.	   Thus,	   prior	   experiences	   of	   pain	   can	   be	   very	  
helpful	  for	  safety-­‐aware	  planning,	  i.e.,	  to	  generate	  plans	  that	  preserve	  robot	  integrity	  
while	  pursuing	  task	  accomplishment.	  	  
We	  have	  proposed	  a	  relational	  RL	  method	  that	  allows	  a	  robot	  to	  reason	  about	  dead-­‐
ends	   and	   their	   causes.	   If	   a	   plan	  might	   lead	   to	   a	   dead-­‐end	   (e.g.,	   one	   that	   potentially	  
includes	  a	  painful	  action	  effect),	  the	  robot	  tries	  to	  find	  an	  alternative	  safe	  plan	  and,	  if	  
not	  found,	  it	  asks	  a	  teacher	  whether	  the	  risky	  action	  should	  be	  executed.	  This	  method	  
permits	   learning	   safe	   policies	   as	  well	   as	  minimizing	   unrecoverable	   errors	   during	   the	  
learning	  process,	  and	  it	  has	  been	  validated	  on	  a	  robot	  learning	  to	  clear	  a	  table	  [12].	  
4.	  Conclusions	  and	  future	  prospects	  
Given	  the	  scarce	  bibliography	  dealing	  explicitly	  with	  robot	  pain,	  this	  chapter	  has	  tried	  
to	  enrich	  its	  review	  with	  related	  research	  works	  about	  robot	  behaviors	  and	  capacities	  
in	  which	  pain	  could	  play	  a	  role.	   It	  has	  been	  shown	  that	  all	  such	  roles	  ⎯ranging	  from	  
punishment	   to	   intrinsic	   motivation	   and	   planning	   knowledge⎯	   can	   be	   formulated	  
within	  the	  unified	  framework	  of	  reinforcement	  learning.	  
We	   foresee	   that	   self-­‐knowledge	   will	   be	   the	   key	   ingredient	   to	   significantly	   increase	  
robot	   autonomy	   in	   the	   years	   to	   come	   and	   that	   pain	   could	   serve	   to	   acquire	   such	  
knowledge.	   Several	   degrees	   of	   self-­‐knowledge	   could	   be	   distinguished	   progressively	  
leading	   to	   more	   complex	   functionalities.	   The	   simplest	   body	   schema	   consisting	   of	   a	  
parameterized	   kinematic/dynamic	  model	   has	   already	   been	   incorporated	   into	   robots	  
through	   sensorimotor	   learning.	   More	   elaborate	   self-­‐models	   would	   include	   a	   body	  
image	  precisely	  delimiting	  the	  robot	  boundaries	  acquired	  through	  exploratory	  actions,	  
leading	  to	  the	  distinction	  between	  a	  body	  self	  and	  others	  [15],	  from	  which	  the	  notions	  
of	  body	  ownership	  and	  agency	  could	  develop.	  These	  would	  ground	  the	  foundations	  for	  
robots	   to	   construct	   a	   model	   of	   their	   own	   physical/cognitive	   abilities	   which,	   for	  
instance,	   could	   allow	   them	   to	   ask	   for	   help	   whenever	   a	   task	   goes	   beyond	   their	  
capabilities	  or	  either	  explore	  new	  actions	  [1]	  and	  try	  to	  acquire	  the	  required	  skills	  if	  no	  
helper	   is	   around.	   Finally,	   some	   authors	   hypothesize	   that	   the	   most	   sophisticated	  
internal	   models	   would	   lead	   to	   consciousness	   [8].	   Whether	   this	   intriguing,	   largely	  
unknown	   feature	   of	   the	   human	   brain	   could	   serve	   a	   functional	   purpose	   in	   robots	  
constitutes	  an	  amazing	  challenge	  for	  future	  technological	  research,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  
time	   posing	   decisive	   questions	   that	   promise	   to	   ignite	   an	   exciting	   moral	   and	   ethical	  
debate.	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